In the end, the idea of core Europe - that is a closely integrated and strongly consolidated European motor "avant-guarding" the rest of the member states - does not necessarily imply something bad. As long each state retains "equal chances and clear path to becoming a member [of the core]," as Jehona Gjurgjeala, Allianz Alumni Academy attendee, underlined. According to Emmanouilidis that is certainly possible, because simply establishing "a closed core" would not pay off for its participants. What's more, Jehona also considers that a workable differentiation may be based on the concept of concentric circles. Entering each circle would require fulfilling some set of demands that should also continue (and be monitored) after joining it. In general she suggests that "membership of the EU should be considered a privilege, not a right."
Another possible benefit to establishing such a "core" could come as a result of limiting the strict division of membership/non-membership by creating an integration ladder: this approach could mean that concepts of partial membership or privileged partnership are developed. These terms describe a new formula for applicant states to integrate with the EU within certain areas in which they've already met the standards (before becoming a full member). However, the concept remains highly controversial and unfortunately largely unimaginable given the current treaties. I'd venture to suggest that it could serve as a good solution particularly for small states such as Moldova, Kosovo or Georgia.
Only one minute more of border control?
But is this differentiated integration only a matter of high politics that doesn't affect our everyday lives? Let's look for instance at one of the most visible "differentiating factors" which is the possibility to cross borders without a passport. Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania are still outside our European borderless travelling paradise established by the Schengen Agreement. Georgi Iliev, a self-described D'Artagnan who is originally from Bulgaria, told me that this is not actually a major problem for regular citizens as long it only takes "one minute more of border control." He also stated that there's no frustration about that matter within Bulgarian society. On the other hand János Fazakas from Romania finds it a bit irritating and cannot comprehend the EU's position when the respective countries have already met all the Schengen demands.
Such ambivalence is quite similar to the concerns that Agata Jaskot, a cosmo-Polish blonde girl, shared with me. Although she can see some reason behind "the differentiated integration" scenario, she still feels that it is contradictory to the idea of integration itself. Moreover, she is deeply annoyed with "the core discourse." "There's no core of Europe," she claims. "Perhaps in terms of politics and economics some states are more important, but Europe is not only about that." When she lived in Paris and observed the French presidential election campaign she often felt angry about the constant reminder that "Germany and France have to take responsibility for Europe." Isn't there something imperialist about this thinking? Doesn't it meant that we are dividing our continent into ruling core empires and subordinate peripheries once again? Differentiation is definitely connected with many threats concerning those aspects of integration which are already highly fragile. It may even call their relevance into question. As Thomas Kösters argued, "doing integration this way means no room for European identity and solidarity."
Don't institutionalise the divisions
Well, differentiation is a fact. A reality catalysed by the crisis that we need to face. The situation implies three tasks. First of all, we should not get complacent and believe that a less severe "cold crisis" (once again Janis Emmanouilidis) means the end of problems - after all, "cold war" didn't mean peace. We should use the possibility to reform Europe. Secondly, crisis is perhaps the first pan-European hot political and concrete topic that - if discussed, reported and governed in an appropriate way - may serve as an unintentional conveyor of the longed-for common European public sphere. A sphere populated not only by distinguished deliberators, but also by those who were hitherto excluded by the questionable "reasonable pluralism" of purely abstract European debates. And finally, we should do our best not to institutionalise the divisions in Europe. Whatever happens, whoever fails to ratify the prophesied treaty in 2017, and whether or not we end up establishing bodies which ignore the current treaties, we must keep Europe open.
